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Public Policies on Children and Families
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has touched American law at many points, both
in legislation and litigation, in many jurisdictions. Most of the legislation has
dealt with public health issues, which are discussed in Chapter 2. In litigation, a
recent article states (Margolick, 1991:1): ''A wave of AIDS-related lawsuits has
swept over the courts. Most involve discrimination, the blood supply, and
criminal prosecutions, but there are innumerable other permutations concerning
everything from free speech to child custody to libel to will contests." Although
the existence of litigation is unquestionable, the quantity is, in fact, unknown.
Whether the "wave" is a tidal wave or a large surf is unclear. Nevertheless, U.S.
law, at the legislative and judicial levels, has had to face difficult and
sometimes unprecedented problems. The panel could have attempted an entire
survey of the effect of AIDS on the legal system, but judged that the evidence,
apart from public health legislation, was still too slim and scattered; we chose,
instead, to focus on one area of legislation and litigation, namely, that which
establishes public policy regarding families and children. This may be but a
small corner in the world of law and public policy, but it is, in our judgment, of
great importance in view of the populations most affected by the HIV/AIDS
epidemic.
All societies have sets of norms that define what relationships count as
family and dictate permissible forms of intimate interaction. In the United States
and other industrialized nations, governments cast many of these norms into
statutes and other formal rules that prescribe such matters as










































































































































































































who can marry, who is financially responsible for the care of children, and what
reproductive control methods are permissible. Governments also use less
coercive policies to guide or reward family-related behavior. They use tax laws
and welfare programs to recognize the needs and costs of those living in certain
family configurations and to validate their acceptability. They use public health
and school programs to encourage people to engage in behaviors considered
socially desirable.
When the AIDS epidemic began, many U.S. policies bearing on families
and other intimate relationships were in a period of transition, and AIDS raised
difficult, often inconvenient, questions of family policy of at least three sorts.
First, because AIDS is transmitted by sexual acts, governments had to come to
grips with widely varying public attitudes about sexual behavior and about the
appropriate role of government in influencing behavior. Everyone knew that
many young people have sex (Hayes, 1987) and that many men have sex with
other men (Fay et al., 1989). Some officials were not alarmed by these
behaviors or, if they were, were willing to acknowledge they existed and urge
precautions. Others, however, were unwilling to appear to condone the
behaviors at all. School boards wrestled and are still wrestling with whether to
distribute condoms to high school students (Galst, 1992), and states and the
federal government responded variously to requests for support of programs
that sought to eroticize safer sexual practices among gay men (Barnes, 1989).
States have similarly wrestled with the degree to which they should rely on
compulsory rules to induce desired sexual behaviors. Thus, many states
considered and two states adopted and then repealed legislation requiring HIV
antibody testing before marriage (Joseph, 1989).1 And many states adopted
statutes making it a felony for persons who knew that they carried the virus to
engage in sex without informing their partner (Hermann, 1990; see also
Chapter 2).
Second, since AIDS is also transmitted perinatally, it necessarily involves
the relationship between a woman and a fetus she is carrying. Government
officials have thus struggled with the appropriate advice to give HIV-infected
women regarding decisions about birth control and abortion (Bayer, 1990).
Many women with HIV have been offered tortured advice wrapped in
euphemisms to "postpone" having children (Centers for Disease Control, 1985).
And, as described in Chapter 4, scientists who have wanted to administer AZT
to HIV-infected pregnant women to learn whether they could prevent
transmission of the virus to the fetus have encountered hostility from women's
advocates seeking to ensure that the pregnant woman's health is in no way
compromised in the name of trying to protect the unborn child.
Third, since AIDS is a protracted illness and invariably leads to death,
family-related policy issues arise during the last stages of the disease and at the
point of death. Disputes have erupted between gay men's lovers and
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parents over such issues as hospital visits or the authority to make decisions
about life-prolonging medical procedures (Steinbrook et al., 1986). Women
with HIV have wanted to keep their children with them as long as possible
under welfare programs that provide little financial support and to control the
placement of their children when they are no longer able to provide care.
This chapter presents case studies of the relationship between AIDS and
two sets of family policies affected by AIDS; even more narrowly, it
concentrates on these policies in a few selected cities and states. The first case
study is that of public issues distinctly related to newborns and children with
AIDS. In programs to keep children with their biological parents and in
programs to respond to children who must be placed with others, New York and
Florida have had to contend with familial issues under strained circumstances—
issues of financial responsibility and parental control. The two states sometimes
responded similarly and sometimes rather differently, but both of their
responses reveal anomalies in public policies that bear on low-income families
with children.
The second case study describes the efforts to gain legal recognition of
nonmarital relationships, particularly the recognition of gay male and lesbian
couples. We examine efforts in San Francisco to pass an ordinance to permit
unmarried couples, including gay and lesbian couples, to register their
relationship with the city and the quite different efforts in New York courts,
legislatures, and agencies to expand the list of relatives entitled to remain in a
rent-regulated apartment after the death of a tenant who had signed the lease. In
each city, the issues had been debated before AIDS was a central feature of the
city's life, but AIDS reshaped the debate in many ways.
NEWBORNS AND CHILDREN
Infants and children with AIDS pose different problems of social and
family policy than adults with AIDS. Most of the differences stem from the
necessarily dependent position of all young children. They must be cared for by
others and decisions must be made for them. Policy makers have long debated
how responsibilities for children and control over children should be divided
between parents and the state (Mnookin and Weisberg, 1988).
In the context of AIDS, problems of social policy arise in painful,
problematic, and revealing manners because AIDS persistently pushes to
extremes the burdens and responsibilities of caretakers and the state. Every
newborn who is HIV positive has a mother who is HIV positive, a woman who
is probably poor and may already be ill herself, a woman who has probably
been an intravenous drug user. Mothers of HIV-infected babies commonly feel
both depression and anxiety due to their own illness and the illness of their
children, and knowing that the child became infected through
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them, they frequently experience guilt and the need for denial (Seibert et al.,
1989; Septimus, 1989).
All babies born to an HIV-infected mother carry passively acquired
maternal antibodies to HIV. However, in only about one-third of such cases is
the infant actually infected with HIV; those infants who are not infected will
gradually lose maternal HIV antibodies, although they may persist until 15
months of age. Since standard tests for HIV detect HIV antibodies and not the
virus itself, they cannot be used reliably to determine which infants born to HIV
positive mothers have been infected until the child has lost the maternal
antibodies. Even the use of less common and more expensive viral cultures is
inappropriate in newborns because a negative culture is not sufficient to exclude
HIV infection (Hardy, 1991). Therefore, the HIV status of infants born to HIV-
infected mothers cannot be known by foster agencies or foster parents until well
after birth.
All children who are actually HIV-infected need extra attention from the
point of birth (Hegarty et al., 1988). Unlike adults with HIV, roughly 20 percent
of newborns with HIV become ill with AIDS-related infections within a year of
their infection. Once ill, they tend to spend more days in the hospital than adults
with AIDS. They typically have chronic growth problems, as well as
developmental problems in both motor and language skills (Falloon et al.,
1989). And all the required care will be delivered by someone who knows that
it is highly probable that the child will die.
Pediatric AIDS thus provides an occasion to examine the impact of a new,
chronic, and fatal illness on two strands of U.S. social policy relating to children
and families. First, it raises the question of how much resources the nation is
willing to devote to the care of children and their caretakers. AIDS tests the
nation's commitment because the resources required for each child are large,
and the children to whom the resources are devoted are among those who are
most likely to be otherwise disenfranchised: babies with AIDS are
overwhelmingly poor and African American or Hispanic. Yet, although they are
the powerless offspring of powerless parents and pediatric AIDS cases (children
under 13 years of age) represent less than 2 percent of all cases of AIDS
(Centers for Disease Control, 1992), these children have received a substantial
share of the public funds expended in response to the epidemic.
Second, pediatric AIDS permits an examination of the allocation of
responsibility for children among parents, extended family, foster parents, and
the state in regard to where a child will live, medical decisions, and financial
costs. AIDS tests the strength of the state's traditional commitment to helping
children remain with their biological parents and to affirming the authority of
biological parents to control medical care decisions relating to their children
(Gaylin and Macklin, 1982; for recent collections
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of essays on the responses to pediatric AIDS in the United States, see Schinazi
and Nahmias, 1988; Seibert and Olson, 1989; and Anderson, 1990).
Resources and Special Programs
This section draws for illustrations on the responses to pediatric AIDS in
New York City and Miami, Florida (and Dade County, of which Miami is a
part), the two U.S. cities with the most cases of pediatric AIDS.2 As of
December 1991, 852 cases of pediatric AIDS had been reported in New York
City and 198 cases in Miami.3
For half a century, the government's principal program of support for low-
income families with children has been the program of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). AFDC provides basic income support in the form
of cash payments. Since the 1960s, Medicaid has been expected to meet the
basic medical needs of AFDC families. Even with the social services that
regularly accompany it, however, AFDC has never been sufficient in most
states to meet the minimal requirements of poor families. In 1988, for example,
two-thirds of states did not provide AFDC grants equal to the state's own
determination of children's minimal needs. Even in states that did meet their
own standard of need, the standards and grants were often very low.
In the early days of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it became clear that the basic
programs of AFDC and Medicaid would be so insufficient to meet the needs of
infected parents and infants that additional governmental assistance was
imperative. It was also apparent that traditional foster care programs and
subsidies would be insufficient to attract foster families for HIV-infected
children who could not live with their biological parents. Thus, states with
growing numbers of pediatric AIDS cases began to develop new programs and,
beginning in 1985, Congress began providing extra money to the states for
services and foster care programs for children with AIDS.4 With that money,
New York City and Miami developed or expanded programs to provide added
support to biological parents who were taking care of HIV-infected children and
to provide noninstitutional settings for the children who could not live with their
parents.
New York City
Special programs and resources created to respond to children with AIDS
in New York City have been varied and substantial.5 Nearly every public
institution that regularly deals with families with children has developed task
forces or programs for children with HIV disease. The state's Department of
Health, for example, designated 10 hospitals in New York City as "AIDS
centers." In those hospitals, every AIDS patient is assigned
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a caseworker, as case manager, who serves as the patient's advocate within the
hospital and coordinates all eligible services; some workers are especially
trained to work with mothers and children (AIDS Institute, 1990a). Other
hospitals have created special units for HIV-infected mothers and their children.
Harlem Hospital, for example, where, by early 1990, between 3 and 4 percent
of all newborns had HIV antibodies, established a unit for women and children
with HIV, which had a staff of 20.
To serve adults and children with AIDS during periods when they are not
hospitalized, New York City's Human Resources Administration formed the
Division of AIDS Services in 1985. By 1990, the division had a staff of 285. In
turn, the division established a demonstration project, the Family and Children's
AIDS Case Management Project, to coordinate all public services for any
family with children in which one or more family members has been diagnosed
with AIDS. Caseworkers in this unit carry much smaller caseloads than usual—
1 caseworker for every 15 families rather than 1 worker for every 30 families.
Most of the families in the program are under such stress from problems other
than AIDS that they need the extra help wholly apart from AIDS. Thus, AIDS,
which evoked a more sympathetic response than, for example, drug addiction,
has opened services that other problems alone had not.
Since nearly all mothers of children with HIV antibodies served by the
Division of AIDS Services are at risk of becoming disabled or dying from HIV
while their children are young, caseworkers try to involve the mother's extended
family, particularly grandparents or siblings of the mother, in helping while the
mother is well enough to provide some care for the child and in providing care
for the child when the mother is unable to continue. The New York project is
particularly proud of these efforts. According to its director, in the first 3 years
of operation, only four of the dozens of children the project had served had to
be removed from the mother and placed in foster care with nonrelatives while
the mother was still alive.
For the minority of children with HIV antibodies who could not remain
with their parents or other family members, agencies in New York City have
mobilized to find appropriate settings for them to live. Incarnation House, for
example, was created to care for children so ill that they need to live in a setting
in which they can have close medical supervision, but not so ill that they need
to be in a hospital all the time. For the great majority of children with HIV
antibodies who could not live at home, however, the goal was to find
appropriate foster families. A crisis had arisen at several New York City
hospitals in 1985 when a substantial number of babies medically ready for
release became long-term hospital residents because their parents were unable
or unwilling to take them home. The boarder babies, believed to be HIV-
infected, were initially even harder to find homes for than other children unable
to live with their parents. They became the
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most visible manifestation of a foster care system already under severe stress
due in substantial part to the growing number of parents with drug-addiction
problems (Joseph, 1988).
Prodded by a lawsuit, New York City made two responses to the boarder
baby situation. First, in 1987 it established a federally supported Hospital Baby
Project to monitor all babies held at any hospital for more than 3 days after
being medically ready for release. Once alerted to the presence of such a baby
in a hospital, the project investigates the reasons for the delay and initiates the
process for finding another placement. By 1989, according to the administrators
of the project, almost no babies testing positive for HIV were being held as
boarders in the city's hospitals.
Second, again supported by federal funds, the city's Human Resources
Administration's Child Welfare Administration created a Pediatric AIDS Unit in
1988 to increase the number of qualified foster placements. The unit entered
into contracts with 5 of the 74 private agencies through which foster children
are placed in the city to create special programs for babies with HIV antibodies.
By September 1990, the unit was overseeing the foster care placements of 426
children with HIV antibodies, about half of whom had been placed through the
5 specialized agencies and half through the other 69.
Under the special foster care program, foster parents receive much higher
payments for caring for a child with HIV antibodies than they receive for caring
for a healthy child without special problems (as of November 1990 $1,281 per
child per month, compared with $400 to $500 a month for most other foster
children). In addition, foster parents of children with HIV antibodies receive an
annual clothing allowance of about $800, a modest additional amount to pay for
respite care, and free equipment, such as carriages and cribs. A foster family
caring for two children with HIV antibodies would thus be given about $32,000
a year, out of which they are expected to provide for all the children's needs
apart from their medical care, which is paid for through Medicaid.
The largest AIDS foster care program in New York City is administered by
Leake and Watts Children's Home, a private agency that began working with
children with HIV antibodies in 1985 and, by 1990, had placed about 110
children into about 45 foster families.6 A high proportion of the foster parents
have worked as nurse's aides or have other nursing training. The foster parents
receive high payments and attentive social services. To support its foster
families, the agency employs a staff of social workers and nurses who make
frequent home visits and are readily available for consultation. The agency is
proud of the foster parents' record of taking care of the children: no child with
HIV antibodies had been removed from a foster parent because of inadequate
care by the foster parent and, of the 110
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children with HIV antibodies placed through them since 1985, 104 were still
alive in 1990.
The foster care relationships established through Leake and Watts have
also been remarkably enduring and stable. Despite the traditional goal of foster
care as a short-term intervention while efforts are made to reunite a child with
the biological parents, only 4 of the 110 children placed with them had returned
to their biological families. In fact, only a small proportion of the children are
visited by their mothers or other biological family members. The agency
attributes the small rate of reunions and visits primarily to the family situations
of the newborns who come to them: the majority enter foster care directly from
the hospital shortly after birth, and virtually all test positive not only for HIV,
but also for heroin or cocaine. Thus, nearly all have mothers who are both drug
users and HIV-infected, and according to the agency, nearly all also have
mothers who decided to leave their children at the hospital rather than take them
home.
Because returning children with HIV antibodies to their biological parents
is not often possible (or often is not in the infants' best interest), a further goal
of New York City's program has been to arrange adoptions for as many of the
foster children as possible. In the fall of 1990, roughly two-thirds of the
children cared for through Leake and Watts were in some stage of the adoption
process, nearly all of them proposed for adoption (or already adopted) by the
foster parents with whom they had been living. In New York, for hard-to-place
children like children with HIV antibodies, foster parents who adopt them
continue to receive all the benefits and services they received as foster parents
(except for the allowance for respite care).
Miami
Many of the same services provided for HIV-infected children in New
York City have been developed in Miami.7 Services there are provided through
the state's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the South Florida
AIDS Network, Jackson Memorial Hospital, and private agencies. Jackson
Memorial is a 1,250-bed public hospital; it provides care for more children with
AIDS than any other hospital in the United States. As of the summer of 1990, it
was providing inpatient and outpatient care to 198 HIV-infected children and to
an additional large number of infants with HIV antibodies who were still too
young to determine whether they actually carried the virus. Of the 198 children,
75 percent were living with one or both biological parents and another 14
percent were being cared for by grandparents or other family members.
Like Harlem Hospital in New York City, Jackson Memorial developed
teams to provide coordinated services to women and children with HIV
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disease. To coordinate public services for families and children outside the
hospital, the hospital undertook a demonstration project, similar to New York's,
that was serving 160 families as of the summer of 1990. Project caseworkers
carry smaller caseloads than usual, 30 families per worker (twice as high as
New York's demonstration project but still substantially lower than the usual
caseload in Miami). The project has been staffed to address the highly diverse
cultural mix of Miami's population. As in New York, very few of the children in
the demonstration project have been removed from a caretaking parent during
the parents' lifetimes.
For the children who cannot remain with their biological parents, Miami
has also established much the same range of foster care programs and support
as New York City (Coppersmith, 1990). In Miami, nearly all children who have
HIV antibodies and who require foster care are placed through a private agency,
the Children's Home Society of Florida, which as of February 1991 was
overseeing 36 children living in 21 foster homes; since January 1988 it had
overseen the placement of 73 children.8 As in New York, the substantial
majority of the children in foster care are African Americans, were born with
traces of heroin or cocaine in their systems, and were the children of women
who were HIV-infected and had at some point been drug users. Florida pays
foster families that care for children with AIDS at an even higher rate than New
York. The rate paid in the two states for an asymptomatic child is similar (about
$1,300 per month), but because the Medicaid administrators in Florida have
approved payments to foster parents for each day that a child is not in the
hospital, foster parents caring for a child with AIDS receive a total of $2,621
per month ($31,452 annually).9
Adoption plays a much smaller role in policies for children with HIV
antibodies in Florida than in New York. In Florida, the state has arranged
adoption for only about 8 of the 73 children placed in foster homes through the
Children's Home Society. Why so many more children have been adopted in
New York is easy to explain: in New York foster parents adopting a hard-to-
place child continue to receive nearly all the payments they received as foster
parents; in Florida, on adoption, nearly all payments cease. Thus, in Florida, the
only children in the HIV program who have been adopted have been a few of
those who, on later testing, had seroconverted and were HIV negative. New
York's principal goal in subsidizing adoptions has been to ensure continuity of
care for hard-to-place children, but not one of the symptomatic children placed
in foster care in Florida through the Children's Home Society has left the foster
family even without an adoption subsidy program; thus, it is unclear whether
New York's system of subsidized adoption has been needed to ensure
continuity. The more significant value of New York's program, also
unmeasured, may lie in helping children, through adoption, feel more a part of a
family and in encouraging
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the foster and adoptive family to form as strong an emotional bond with the
child as possible.
Anomalies in the Allocation of Resources
Miami and New York have developed impressive programs for responding
to the needs of children with HIV infection. The projects just described are only
part of the cities' extensive efforts. And yet, as ever, there are anomalies and
inconsistencies in the public response. This section discusses some of the
principal anomalies; although there are sometimes persuasive explanations for
each of them, their cumulative effect remains troubling.
As a starting point, the very scale of the public commitment to infants with
HIV infection may itself seem anomalous both as an absolute commitment of
resources and in relation to expenditures for adults with HIV. The costs of
caring for a baby with AIDS are very high. The medical costs alone often
exceed $50,000 a year for children who spend many days in the hospital
(Hegarty et al., 1988). If a child is in a foster home, the foster parents will be
paid between $15,000 and $30,000 per year for the child's care. Whether or not
the child is in foster care, social workers and other public employees who help
oversee the child's care cost an additional several thousand dollars per child
each year. The public commitment is also high when measured not in dollars
but in people—specialized hospital staff, foster parents, social workers who
serve biological and foster parents, and specially assigned agency staff. Some
indication of the scale of such programs is the size of the Sixth Annual National
Pediatric AIDS Conference, a five-day conference held in Washington, D.C., in
February 1991, at which more than 200 papers were presented, a large
proportion of which dealt with local programs of care around the country.
According to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1988),
federal expenditures for children with AIDS in 1988 totalled $98 million, not
including AFDC grants. State and local expenditures total several thousand
more per child. In a nation frequently criticized for its uneven commitment to
the well-being of children, and particularly to African American and Hispanic
children, this expenditure of resources is substantial by any standard.
The commitment of high expenditures for HIV-infected children is in part
easy to explain. As to hospital costs, for example, no special congressional
appropriation was needed in the late 1980s to expend tens of millions of dollars
each year on HIV-infected children. When the AIDS epidemic began, the
Medicaid program was already in place to provide medical care for low-income
adults and children; the critical public decision to respond to the medical care of
the poor had been made in the mid-1960s. And even
PUBLIC POLICIES ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 210
before Medicaid, public hospitals had been assigned the responsibility of
treating the sick and dying who could not afford care.
More complex to explain are the new programs authorized by Congress
that were specifically addressed to HIV-infected children—the programs, for
example, that provided funds for the extra services in New York and Miami for
HIV-positive children living with their biological parents and the funds for
special foster care programs. The funds for these programs are not only
substantial in themselves, but also in comparison with funds appropriated for
extra services for adults with HIV. In the 1989 federal budget, for example,
programs for out-of-hospital social services for children with HIV received $7.8
million; in comparison, such programs for adults received $14.7 million, even
though there were over 40 adults with AIDS for every child with AIDS. In the
1990 budget, the support for such services for children nearly doubled to $15
million, but the budget for adult services increased only to $17.4 million, even
though the number of pediatric cases had not increased as a proportion of all
cases (Kirp, 1990). State budgets have also often been disproportional in their
support of child-related HIV programs.
Because of their greater dependency, children may well require more
expensive social services than adults, but that is hardly the total explanation for
the proportionately greater commitment of resources to children. Part of the
answer is simply that programs for poor children have always garnered more
money than programs for poor adults. For example, neither the AFDC program
nor any other federal program provides income support to nondisabled adults
without children, no matter how poor they are. In one sense, the usual
justification for higher public expenditures for children than adults does not
apply in the context of AIDS: the usual justification, similar to the justification
for public education, is that children are the nation's future, and income support
and other programs are investments in that future, a way of providing
opportunity. But sadly, of course, most children with HIV have very limited
futures.
Thus, the better explanation for the higher expenditure for HIV-infected
children is simply that as a nation, Americans are more sympathetic to their
plight than to the plight of HIV-infected adults. Children with HIV may be
viewed with more sympathy than adults because they are seen as morally
blameless for the behavior that led to their illness. Moreover, to a degree vastly
dwarfed by their number, the pediatric AIDS cases that have been brought to
Congress's attention most forcefully have remained, even in 1990, the children
with hemophilia or children who have received transfusions, not the children of
heroin-injecting minority mothers. The major AIDS funding legislation of 1990
for both adults and children—the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources
Emergency (CARE) Act—was, for example, named for a white, middle-class
child with hemophilia.
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A second anomaly in the deployment of resources is the differences in
expenditures among the states. The AFDC program rests on federal legislation,
but it is partially funded by the states, and the states are largely free to fix the
grant levels. States are also free to vary the range of care provided through
Medicaid. New York and Florida aptly illustrate the gross disparity of payments
among the states. In New York, in early 1991, the basic AFDC grant for a
parent and one child was $439 per month; in Florida, the same family would
have received $211 per month. This difference cannot be explained by
differences in the costs of living—Florida does not estimate that children need
less to live on than New York estimates; rather, the difference lies in
fundamental differences in the political environments of the two states. New
York taxes its citizens at high rates (compared with almost all other states) and
supports one of the nation's most extensive social welfare systems. Florida,
without a state income tax, has chosen to spend much less on the needs of the
poor and on services of all sorts. Florida ranks 48th among the states in
expenditures per capita for health and social services, and it ranks 47th in
Medicaid expenditures per capita for eligible poor people (Preston, Andrews,
and Howell, 1989). In this light, Florida's unusually high payments to foster
parents caring for HIV-symptomatic children is particularly anomalous.
AIDS arose in the context of a welfare system already widely divergent
among states. In some respects, the federal response to AIDS has ameliorated
the differences among states, for Congress has accepted the burdens of AIDS as
so extraordinary that it has agreed that the federal government should bear
nearly all the costs of special demonstration projects, such as those to provide
extra services for HIV-infected children living at home. The Ryan White CARE
Act similarly provides extra federal money to heavily affected cities, such as
New York City and Miami, without regard to variations in the financial
commitment that the particular cities and states have already made. Still, even
with these extra infusions of money, a child with HIV who is eligible for AFDC
in Florida and living with his or her mother has less income available and
probably will be helped by a caseworker with a substantially larger caseload
than a similar child in New York.
The disparities among states are matched by disparities within states. Even
within Florida or New York, a child with HIV disease living in some settings
receives much more support from the state than a child living in other settings.
Some of these differences are the inevitable product of large bureaucracies and
patchwork programs. In New York City, for example, some children with HIV
disease are in the enriched, low-caseload demonstration programs for families
operated by the Department of AIDS Services. Other children receive help from
the division but not through a special program and have a caseworker with a
larger caseload. Still others, particularly children who have HIV disease who
live in a family in which
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no one is yet symptomatic, are not eligible to receive services from the division,
and no special attention may be devoted to their HIV-related needs, such as
prophylactic treatments that might delay progression of illness.
Some other within-state differences faced by HIV-infected children are
more deliberate and more dramatic in their scale. As noted above, a child living
with a foster family will receive vastly greater financial support from the state
than a child living with a biological parent: in Florida, $2,621 each month to the
foster mother, $211 in AFDC payments to the biological mother. The child
living with his or her mother remains in poverty; the other child joins the
middle class. Wide disparities exist even in the social services that these HIV-
infected children receive. In New York, for example, a caseworker with Leake
and Watts Children's Home will carry a caseload of only 9 to 12 HIV-infected
foster children, even though the children are living with well-trained foster
parents, while a caseworker for an HIV-infected child living with his or her
mother will have a caseload of 15 to 30 children.
The gap in expenditures on HIV-infected children living with and living
apart from their biological parents is, from one perspective, easy to explain, but
it rests on assumptions about family responsibilities and the responsibilities of
others that are rarely examined. In this country, states do not expect to have to
pay biological parents to help them care for their children. When governments
provide modest cash payments through AFDC and support for food through
food stamps, most Americans think of the benefits not as compensation but as
charity—the ''dole"—or, at best, a social investment in the future of children
(Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey, 1990). In contrast, except in the context of
adoption, government not only expects to have to pay strangers to take care of
the children of others but also to pay them amply to take care of other people's
children who are sick. The high payments for foster care for HIV-infected
children have been based largely on an estimate of what it would take to attract
a decent quality of care for a very needy group of babies. Foster care payments
to third persons have always been higher, even for robustly healthy children,
than AFDC payments to biological parents. With AIDS, the disparities are
simply at their greatest. And the gap in the rate reveals a deep irony: a child is
much better off when supported by the state to live with strangers than when
supported by the state to live at home, although the latter is the setting
governments claim to prefer. Legislators and policy makers extol the nuclear
family, but in the context of AIDS they create a set of financial arrangements
under which a mother who deeply loves her child might decide that she can
show her love best by placing the child in foster care. Conversely, state
officials, facing the huge difference between the payments to biological and
foster parents, have an incentive to create policies that
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encourage leaving children with their biological parents even when a particular
child seems at substantial risk of harm in that setting.
The disparity between payments for foster parents unrelated to a child and
AFDC payments for biological parents provides the foundation for another
nagging and more mundane problem of resource allocation that is also
particularly visible in the context of AIDS. New York has repeatedly struggled
with the appropriate foster payment scheme for children, with and without HIV
disease, who are placed with a relative who has no legal obligation to care for
the child but who nonetheless takes the child in. As described above, when a
mother of a child with HIV disease becomes too ill to care for the child, the
state tries to find another biological family member willing to provide the care.
Biological relatives are preferred as caretakers when the parents are unable to
provide care for some deeply rooted reasons of policy: to carry out the probable
desires of the parents themselves, to preserve the child's emotional attachments
with persons who have been significant to them, and to preserve cultural and
blood ties for their own sake. Relatives are also preferred for a less flattering
reason: they are expected to be willing to care for children for less money than
strangers have to be paid to perform the same task. Thus, the goal in setting
foster care payments for relatives, as it is for unrelated foster parents, seems
simply to be to find the lowest rate that will induce enough relatives to become
caretakers in a world in which many relatives will do so without special support
and others will need an inducement.
In New York, a solution to the problem of foster payments for relatives
was reached, after acrimonious litigation outside the context of AIDS (Matter of
Eugene F. v. Gross, Sup.Ct., N.Y. County, Index No. 1125/86), that reflects the
ambivalence of both policy makers and relatives: if a parent places the child
with a relative, such as a grandparent, without the intervention of the state, the
grandparent is eligible for AFDC payments only, but if the state intervenes first,
on the grounds that the child is without an appropriate caretaker, and arranges
for the grandparent to take the child, then the grandparent (or aunt or other
relative) is compensated at the higher foster parent rate. There is a rough logic
to this compromise position: it distinguishes, it appears, between a relative who
wants to take care of a child and a relative who has to be recruited. In practice,
however, what often occurs is that families with relatives willing to help
nonetheless contrive to get the state to intervene so that the relatives, often
themselves living in poverty, can be eligible for the much higher foster parent
payments.
In the context of AIDS (and other problems that make children especially
hard to place), the disparity between foster care and AFDC payments is at its
greatest, and thus the incentives are greatest for relatives to enlist the state's aid
in arranging placements. Indeed, the incentive is such that it might enduce a
biological mother to agree to the state's placing her child
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with a relative and then secretly continuing to live with the relative so that
the child can receive the benefit of the most generous levels of payments and
the care of her or his mother.
Anomalies in Policies Regarding HIV Testing and Medical
Decisions
The anomalies in the allocation of financial resources for HIV-infected
children are matched by anomalies in the allocation of responsibilities for
making decisions on behalf of children. The anomalies are particularly apparent
in policies regarding testing children for HIV antibodies and the participation of
HIV-infected children in clinical trials.
For testing, most clinicians now believe that it is important to identify in
infancy children who may be infected in order to begin prophylactic treatment
and to monitor them for signs of treatable infections (Cabat, 1990; Oleske,
1990). In March 1991, for example, the CDC issued guidelines for early
prophylaxis for Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) in HIV-infected
children and called for testing of pregnant women and newborns (Centers for
Disease Control, 1991). The Institute of Medicine also recently issued a report
calling for a program of offering tests to all pregnant women in areas with a
high prevalence of HIV (Hardy, 1991). Despite the wide agreement on the
desirability of testing, hospitals in many states, even hospitals in areas of high
incidence, do not routinely offer HIV antibody testing to all pregnant women.
To some extent the problem is one of resources. Some hospital staffs would like
to offer tests but lack the funds to hire the pre-and posttest counselors required
by law and good medical practice. Recently, New York provided special funds
to 23 hospitals as a part of a broad program of voluntary testing in the context
of prenatal and postpartum care (AIDS Institute, 1990b), but many states,
although providing care to children known to be ill with HIV disease, do not
seek to identify all those who need care.
Even when hospitals do offer testing to pregnant women, however, many
women decline to be tested and thus many infected newborns remain
unidentified. In one study in a high-incidence area of New York City, for
example, a hospital offered tests to 221 women who gave birth at a hospital
without having previously received prenatal care. Of this group, a group
thought likely to include an especially high level of HIV infection, only about
one-half the women agreed to be tested (Hiranandani et al., 1991). Neither New
York nor Florida imposes testing on pregnant women, and both refuse to test a
child without parental consent. The Institute of Medicine, in its recent report,
stressed the urgency of identifying infected children, but came out strongly
against imposing testing on women and children (Hardy, 1991). The AIDS task
force of the American Academy of
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Pediatrics has concurred in this position, as has the Working Group on HIV
Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns (1990) at Johns Hopkins University.
The reluctance to impose universal testing on pregnant women is generally
justified by concern for the dignity and autonomy of women. If the motive for
testing is for a woman's own sake, then the objections to doing so without her
consent are the same as the objections to imposing other medical procedures on
adults even when the state is confident that the procedure would be in the adult's
best interest—a respect for individual choice and a skepticism about the
motives of the state when it purports to act in such a paternalistic manner
(Levine and Bayer, 1989). Thus, nearly all states impose testing on unwilling
adults only in very narrow circumstances,10 and the federal Ryan White CARE
Act prohibits states' receiving funds under certain sections of the act from
imposing testing on unconsenting adults except in a few instances (Section 2661
(b)).
If the state's motive for testing a pregnant woman is solely to identify
candidates for a program to reduce transmissions to children or for early
medical intervention, then the objections are somewhat different. In these
circumstances, the state is, in the view of many, using the woman simply as a
vehicle for reaching her child. The hostility expressed toward testing for such
purposes is similar to the objections that have been raised to clinical trials using
zidovudine (AZT) on HIV-infected pregnant women solely to learn whether it
is possible to prevent the transmission of the infection to their children (see
Chapter 4).
Finally, if the state waits until after birth to test a newborn (but not her or
his mother) without the mother's consent, it imposes two forms of intrusion on
the mother. First, it compels her to learn her own status, which may be
objectionable for the reasons just discussed. Second, even if it were possible to
test a child without revealing the HIV status of the mother, imposing the test
overrides the mother's control over her child in a society that leaves nearly all
decisions about children to parents. States leave the control of children to
parents in part because they believe that parents in general know better than
anyone else what is good for their particular child. Even when the state believes
it knows a child's needs better than the parents, it is reluctant across a very
broad range to impose medical or other decisions over a parent's objections.
They tend to do so only in circumstances, such as an emergency blood
transfusion for a child of parents who are Jehovah's Witnesses, in which the
child's life is at immediate risk (Bennett, 1976; Goldstein, 1977).11
The reasons that states do not impose such decisions reflect the most
elemental views about parenting and the role of the state. Children are born to—
come from the bodies of—particular parents, and most parents regard begetting
and raising children as one of life's most fulfilling activities.
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Affirming the responsibility of parents for making decisions on their
children's behalf acknowledges this fundamental, socially useful drive. When
the Supreme Court speaks of a constitutional presumption of biological parents'
control over a child's life, it is speaking of rights that belong to the parent, not
rights that belong to the child (Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977)). Affirming the authority of parents
also affirms, in general, the acceptability of diverse childrearing practices in a
nation without a single orthodoxy about appropriate ways to raise children, and
it helps preserve racial, ethnic, and religious identities in a nation of diverse
cultures.
Yet empowering parents to refuse HIV testing for their newborn appears to
pit the interests of parents against the interests of children since a child cannot
be treated if her or his illness is not known. If early prophylaxis becomes
increasingly effective for children, the tension between children's and parents'
interests will become increasingly acute. At this time, the great reluctance to
override parental choice is probably defensible. Arguments for state-imposed
testing of newborns that rest on available treatments for the children who are
identified have moral force only if the state actually makes such treatments
available to all children who need them. But large numbers of children in the
United States live in families ineligible for Medicaid and not covered by any
type of private medical insurance: these children would be unlikely to receive
appropriate care for HIV disease or AIDS. Even those children who are covered
by Medicaid face obstacles to adequate care in many places (Hopkins, 1989).
Even if care were assured, there remain some child-centered reasons why a
mother, especially a mother who does not know her own HIV status, might
refuse testing for her child. The mother might justly worry about breaches of
confidentiality and the stigma that would attach to her and to her child if others
—neighbors, unsympathetic relations—learn that she and the baby have HIV.
She might also worry about her own ability to cope with learning her status and
the depression and anxiety that might then interfere with her capacity to parent.
She and her child might both be better off if she could surmount those fears and
learn her own status and the status of her child, but it cannot be claimed that a
refusal to permit a child to be tested is always a selfish and unloving act. In
addition, imposing testing on a woman who is poor may reinforce her own
sense of powerlessness, while making testing within her control may not only
give her some sense of power, but also encourage hospital staff to provide
information about the values to the child of learning his or her status. A mother
who has voluntarily consented to a child's testing, moreover, may be more
likely to participate actively and enthusiastically in planning for meeting the
medical needs of the child long after the test (Nolan, 1989).
The control that parents are accorded over HIV testing extends to other
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decisions about the children's health care, including decisions to permit a child
to receive an experimental drug and decisions to authorize surgery and other
invasive procedures. All research on children poses difficult ethical issues
(Gray, 1989), and this section considers those issues in the context of a final
anomaly: Why is it that foster parents for HIV-infected children (who are
usually well trained and under less stress than the biological parents of the
children) and other agents of the state are not permitted the same authority as
the biological parent regarding experimental drugs and surgery? For a child in
foster care in New York, an agency that receives a request for testing from a
foster parent first tries to locate and obtain consent from the biological parent
(s). Without a biological parent's consent, the agency has to make a
determination that testing will be in the child's interests. In a few states the
policies are so restrictive that no HIV testing of a child in foster care is possible
without consent of the biological parent(s), and some parents cannot be found to
give consent (Baughman et al., 1989).
The reasons that broad powers are accorded to parents were examined
above. To accord the same powers to foster parents might be seen as
undercutting or denigrating the authority of biological parents, even in
circumstances in which the powers of the biological parent have largely been
suspended by placing the child in foster care.12 The powers of foster parents are
kept limited not only to recognize the authority of the biological parents, but
also because foster parents are, after all, paid agents or employees of the state,
performing a job for the state. Although encouraged to shower an HIV child
with attention and affection—"Hugging and kissing will help keep your [foster]
child healthy," says one information sheet for foster parents—they may
inappropriately put their own interests ahead of those of the child. Outside the
context of AIDS, states have on several recent occasions been sued by
biological parents because of the abusive treatment that a child suffered at the
hands of foster parents (Oren, 1990). Within the context of AIDS, however, it is
questionable whether these reservations about foster parents have a reasonable
foundation. At least in New York and Florida, the child placement agencies
believe that the highly paid foster parents are exceptionally committed to their
foster children's well-being and exceptionally well informed about the children's
medical and other needs.
With regard to experimental drugs, even the state distrusts itself as
caretaker and seeks to protect children against any interests being taken into
account other than a specific child's. Thus, in New York, when a proposal was
made to permit children in foster care to participate in an experimental drug
trial, such as the initial proposals to give AZT to infants, the question that the
state agency put to itself was not whether all infants with HIV would be
benefited by the knowledge to be gained from the experiment, but, rather,
whether there was a sound basis for believing that the particular
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children for whom the experimental drug was proposed would themselves
receive a medical benefit from participating in the test. On that basis, foster
children have not been permitted to participate in a clinical trial in which they
might receive a placebo. Biological parents are not subject to such limits. For
example, they might agree to a child's participation in an FDA-approved
experimental protocol motivated not solely by concern for their child but also
by altruistic concerns for other children, present and future, who might benefit
from the treatment. It may seem paradoxical that biological parents are
permitted to be less concerned for the welfare of their children than the state,
but the state's self-imposed restraint is surely wise—at least in ordinary
circumstances. It is wise because of the risk that the state will consider children
for broader social goals without giving adequate weight to an individual child's
needs.
There is, however, a problem with too much restraint in the context of
AIDS. AIDS is a disease in which the current treatment of choice is often a drug
still in the experimental stages. Restraint may prevent HIV-infected children in
foster care form gaining access to drugs that will permit them longer lives. One
study found that very few children in foster care have been among children
included in clinical trials—no foster children in Florida, for example, had
participated in clinical trials as of 1989—and concluded that many states
needed new procedures to increase foster children's access to experimental
medications (Martin and Sacks, 1990; see also U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 1988).
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF UNMARRIED COUPLE
RELATIONSHIPS
San Francisco and New York, the two U.S. cities with the largest numbers
of cases of AIDS among gay men, provide opportunities for examining family
policies that primarily affect adults. They provide particularly rich opportunities
to examine efforts to gain legal recognition for gay, lesbian, and other
unmarried couples and the role of AIDS in the debates that accompanied those
efforts. Although it is impossible to tell whether the changes in law that have
occurred would have occurred anyway, it is at least certain that AIDS played a
central role in framing the context for, and in shaping the public discourse that
accompanied, those changes.
In both San Francisco and New York City, recent efforts to extend
protections to people in unmarried relationships, heterosexual and homosexual,
were an outgrowth of efforts that preceded the AIDS epidemic but were given
new impetus by it. The 1970s and 1980s were a time of ferment in U.S. political
and social history over the meaning of marriage (Bernard, 1972; Glendon,
1989) and the position of homosexual people in society (Altman, 1983). Until
quite recently, in most states, most forms of sexual
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activity with another consenting adult of the same sex have been illegal, and
only one sort of "couple" has been recognized by the law—the couple of a man
and a woman married in a ceremony sanctioned by the state (Barnett, 1973).
Even today, in most states a couple, whether of the same or different sexes,
who live together outside of marriage have no more rights or entitlements
through their relationship than any two friends or roommates (Weitzman, 1981).
They cannot file a joint tax return. If one dies without a will, the other will not
inherit his or her property regardless of the nature of their relationship. And,
even with a will, the survivor cannot obtain the benefit of state and federal
estate tax laws that permit passing property to a spouse without payment of a
tax. Nor can the survivor obtain Social Security survivor benefits.
In the two decades preceding the first reported cases of AIDS, changes had
begun in some states' responses to unmarried couples in general and to gay and
lesbian couples in particular. Those changes occurred largely in the courts,
rather than the legislatures. A few courts began to provide relief to unmarried
partners, heterosexual and homosexual, on the breakup of a relationship when
they could prove some sort of explicit or implied agreement between the
partners to share property or support each other (Blumberg, 1981). And some
other state courts invalidated (and several state legislatures repealed) laws
making voluntary sexual relations between persons of the same sex a crime
(Harvard Law Review, 1989).
Efforts to gain more formal recognition of ongoing gay and lesbian
relationships were more halting. The critical difference between the position of
gay and lesbian couples and the position of heterosexual unmarried couples is
that heterosexual couples, except in unusual circumstances, are free to marry if
they choose but homosexual couples are not. Thus, some gay men and lesbians
have fought for the recognition of homosexual marriage. In an effort to force
recognition, some gay male couples have sought marriage licenses and, when a
license was refused, have filed actions in court claiming that their state's statutes
ought to be read to permit persons of the same sex to marry or, in the
alternative, that denying same-sex couples a marriage license unconstitutionally
deprived them of the equal protection of the laws. As of 1991, no courts had
accepted the arguments. Nor had any state legislatures amended their marriage
statutes to permit persons of the same sex to marry.
For many, the issue is highly symbolic. Marriage is a central public and
communal ritual: if people of the same sex can marry, they can consider
themselves brought within the community of respectable persons in the society
(Stoddard, 1989). Other homosexual people, however, found aspects of the
symbolism of marriage deeply troubling. Some lesbians, in
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particular, view marriage in its traditional terms as a state in which women are
dependent, dominated, and systematically exploited (Ettelbrick, 1989).
Regardless of their views about marriage, however, nearly all gay and
lesbian activists agreed that there were important pragmatic reasons for wanting
to gain some sort of legal recognition for gay and lesbian partner relationships:
the many benefits, such as access to health insurance and various government
benefits, that one person can obtain through another or that two persons treated
as a couple can obtain at lesser cost than two persons treated as individuals.
Although in some sense, fighting for the right to obtain benefits through another
person may reinforce images of dependency, most advocates viewed the issue
as one of simple justice, of securing the advantages widely made available to
heterosexual married couples.
In recent years, gay activists who work on issues relating to couples have
largely focused their efforts on getting courts and legislatures either to
recognize a special status for unmarried persons—often termed domestic
partnership—or, more narrowly, to recognize the unmarried couple relationship
for some particular purpose. For those who are uncomfortable with the social
meaning of marriage, the term partnership conveys an attractive image of two
persons as equals, not of two persons arrayed in a hierarchy. As described
below, efforts to gain legal recognition for domestic partners have taken place
in San Francisco and New York since the epidemic of AIDS began and seem to
have been affected by the epidemic.13
San Francisco
In November 1990 voters in San Francisco approved an ordinance to
permit unmarried persons to register with the city as domestic partners. The
ordinance was adopted by a wide margin, and the gay community of San
Francisco regarded the vote as a triumphant affirmation for all gay persons. The
road to its passage, however, begun eight years earlier, had been strewn with
potholes and detours.
The Early Years
The first effort in San Francisco for a domestic partnership ordinance
occurred in 1982, after some cases of AIDS had been reported, but before AIDS
had deeply imprinted itself on the minds of most San Franciscans. On that
occasion, Harry Britt, at that time the only gay member of the city's Board of
Supervisors, proposed legislation to permit unmarried couples to register with
the city if they affirmed that they shared "the common necessaries of life" and
that they were each other's "principal domestic partner." The bill prohibited the
city from treating domestic partners and married persons differently.
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The Board of Supervisors passed the bill, but the city's major newspapers and
the Catholic church opposed it, and then Mayor Dianne Feinstein, who had
supported many initiatives favored by gay men and lesbians, vetoed it. Mayor
Feinstein objected to what she considered the broad potential reach of the bill
and expressed fears about the impact of the bill on the institution of marriage.
When Supervisor Britt introduced essentially the same bill the following year,
the mayor announced that she would veto it again if it was passed, and the bill
was withdrawn. AIDS played little role in the debate, although by 1983 many
cases of AIDS had been identified, and some of those who opposed the bill
argued that it would lead to medical insurance coverage for the partners of gay
city employees and thus, eventually, to increased medical care costs for the city.
Six years passed before domestic partnership legislation was introduced
again. In 1989 the effort was renewed, and an ordinance was initially adopted,
rejected by the voters, proposed again, and finally adopted. Supervisor Britt
continued to lead the efforts in a social and political context that had changed in
the intervening years. A few smaller cities in California, including Berkeley,
Santa Cruz, and West Hollywood, had by then adopted ordinances to provide
health insurance coverage for domestic partners of city employees. Harry Britt
was now president of the Board of Supervisors, and the city's new mayor, Art
Agnos, had run on a platform supporting domestic partnership legislation. And
AIDS had by then taken the lives of nearly 4,000 gay men in San Francisco
alone and tens of thousands of others were HIV positive. By 1989, many
believe, AIDS had substantially reshaped the meaning of nearly all political
issues in San Francisco, including the issue of domestic partnership legislation,
although it is, as ever, impossible to know what would have occurred over the 6
years in the absence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
Both proponents and opponents of the legislation believe that an initial
broad way in which AIDS had altered the context by 1989 was that the
epidemic had made gay and lesbian people more politically aware and active
across a whole range of issues affecting their lives. Even in 1982 San Francisco
had the most politically powerful gay and lesbian community among all large
U.S. cities, and many lesbians had long been active in women's political forums.
In the years after 1982, however, the number of gay men who became involved
in political efforts grew substantially because of the large number whose lives
were affected by AIDS and who believed that government needed to respond
more forcefully to the epidemic (Altman, 1988). For many gay men through the
early 1980s, if they were politically involved at all, their goal was to persuade
the government to leave gay people alone to live their lives as they pleased. By
the late 1980s, however, many gay men sought a far more active and responsive
role from the state.
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Just as AIDS made people more politically aware in general, so it also
helped determine the particular political issues in which they became involved.
Some issues were new and directly related to AIDS, such as efforts to persuade
the California legislature and U.S. Congress to provide more funds for AIDS
research and treatment programs and efforts to head off legislation that would
have led to mandatory testing of people believed to be at high risk for infection.
What was distinctive about Supervisor Britt's domestic partnership legislation
was that it was an old issue infused with new content because of AIDS, in much
the same way that efforts to provide legal protections for handicapped people
have been enlarged by the inclusion of people with AIDS among those believed
to deserve protection against discrimination.
For gay men and lesbians, AIDS altered the significance of the domestic
partnership issue in two particular ways. In the widest sense, the large number
of gay people who had cared for their ill partners made many homosexual
people appreciate an aspect of their lives that had always been there but had
never before seemed so salient. Jean Harris, a lesbian activist and assistant to
Harry Britt, observed: ''AIDS made us realize that our lovers are our support
systems. It made us more aware of the importance of primary relationships. It
made love and relationships even more important than they had seemed before"
(interview, May 31, 1990). However, in some ways, especially for gay men, the
very notions of domesticity and mutual dependence associated with long-term
relationships seemed inconsistent with the spirit of liberation for which they had
strived in the 1970s.
Much more specifically, AIDS also brought home the price that
homosexual people had been paying for the social and legal nonrecognition of
their relations. That price revealed itself when the biological families of gay
men with AIDS tried to exclude their sons' partners from hospital visitation or
from participating in decisions about life-prolonging medical treatment. It
revealed itself, after death, in struggles over burial and property (Eisenberg,
1991). And, most urgently for many gay men, it revealed itself in access to
medical insurance: many employers provided coverage to the spouses of their
workers, but none provided coverage to a worker's unmarried partner. Many
people with AIDS ceased to be able to work, lost their health insurance
coverage, and could not obtain coverage through their partners (Padgug and
Oppenheimer, 1990).
For people outside the gay and lesbian communities, AIDS had also altered
the meaning of the domestic partnership issue. In San Francisco, many people
knew and most had read about gay men who were providing care for a dying
partner. They had heard about and seen pictures from the "Names Project," the
quilt pieced from panels commemorating those who died of AIDS. For many,
their image of the gay male community had expanded beyond hedonism to
include tenderness, self-sacrifice, and suffering.
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With familiarity, they became more responsive to claims of a need to
recognize gay partners than they had been in 1982.
For others, the association between AIDS and gay men remained different
and negative. What came to mind when they thought about gay men's
relationships was not the sympathetic image of bedside care but the sexual acts
that were the means of HIV transmission. The public service ads posted all over
San Francisco to encourage gay men to use condoms reminded some people not
of lives that might be saved but of conduct they considered immoral. Some
people who were unsympathetic also worried, more mundanely, about the
financial costs of responding to the people with HIV disease. They rejected the
idea of sharing the cost of providing benefits for people whose sexual behavior
they abhorred.
During the campaign of 1989 (and 1990), the various conflicting images of
AIDS helped shape the proponents' approach to drafting and promoting the
domestic partnership legislation, as well as the response of the opponents. Thus,
in the spring of 1989, when the domestic partnership bill was first reintroduced,
it was framed slightly differently than the 1982 version. As before, the bill
prohibited the city and county from drawing legal distinctions between married
persons and persons who had registered as domestic partners. This time,
however, to direct attention to the affective aspects of relationships, it defined
domestic partners as "two people who have chosen to share one another's lives
in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring." A new provision,
clearly drawing on images from the epidemic, provided that, if a person was
hospitalized and had made no designation of desired visitors, a person
registered as a domestic partner would be permitted to visit.
The bill did not address medical insurance benefits for domestic partners
because insurance matters were beyond the authority of the supervisors, even
for city employees. Thus, even though the new bill prohibited discrimination on
the basis of marital status, it would not, if passed, have imposed new health
insurance costs on the city. By a separate action, the mayor, at the Board of
Supervisors' direction, established a Task Force on Family Policy to study,
among many issues, the feasibility of making insurance benefits available to
domestic partners and other extended family members living with an employee
and to make recommendations to the Health Services Systems Board, the
agency with the authority over insurance benefits for city employees.
The Board of Supervisors unanimously passed the new domestic
partnership bill in May 1989, and the mayor promptly signed it. Many
conservatives were deeply dismayed. A group of Catholic and conservative
Protestant clergy and laypersons banded together and gathered the signatures
needed to place the ordinance on the ballot for the November election. A
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campaign then began to persuade voters to support or defeat the legislation. The
HIV/AIDS epidemic affected the tactics of both sides.
The proponents placed images from the epidemic at the center of their
campaign. The principal flyer distributed by the Domestic Partnership
Campaign Committee began as follows:
Imagine having spent a lifetime with a partner, sharing a home, sharing
responsibilities. Your partner becomes ill—and you don't even have the right
to visit him or her in the hospital. Your partner dies—and you don't even have
the right to leave work for the funeral. That's the cruel reality for many San
Franciscans.
A few paragraphs later, the pamphlet subtly boosted the legislation as a
tool to reduce the spread of AIDS. It asked, "Should the City of San Francisco
encourage long-term, stable relationships, especially in the time of AIDS?" and
then answered its own question, "Yes, of course." In much the same terms, a
letter in campaign materials signed by a group of Republicans supporting the
bill argued, ''We believe it is good governmental policy to encourage the
strengthening of stable, interdependent, caring and lasting relationships—
particularly in the era of AIDS." The San Francisco Democratic Central
Committee in its own campaign letter was more direct. The bill, it said, "helps
in the fight against AIDS. It promotes long-term stable relationships."
Some people in the gay and lesbian communities were quite ambivalent
about promoting the bill as a tool for encouraging gay men and lesbians to enter
stable relationships. To be sure, they wanted to use whatever messages would
attract voters, and there was something attractive about this appeal: it invited
people by their vote to do their personal bit to halt the spread of AIDS, a civic
gesture that had no cost in dollars. But many proponents resented the
implication that gay men and lesbians needed legislation to learn to appreciate
the values of loving relationships. Tens of thousands of lesbians and gay men in
San Francisco were already in long-term relationships, and this group believed
that most San Franciscans knew it. In their view, what gay people needed was
recognition and equal treatment for relationships that already existed, not a
public health gimmick to encourage monogamy.
The proponents also addressed AIDS in another way, by seeking to allay
fears about the costs associated with the legislation. The pamphlet and other ads
argued that the passage of the legislation would not, in itself, provide health or
pension benefits to domestic partners. The point about costs would have been
important to make even if AIDS had not existed, but it was especially important
because it did.
At each stage of the political process, the proponents were thus responding
to needs created by the epidemic and to the sympathies and fears
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that the epidemic had engendered. Although the legislation applied to
unmarried heterosexual couples as well as to homosexual couples, to lesbian
couples as well as to gay male couples, to domestic partners who were well and
domestic partners who were ill, the most frequent image conveyed by the
proponents of the bill was of gay men and their partners in the context of AIDS.
The proponents would have favored the legislation, just as they had in 1982,
without regard to the epidemic, but AIDS had increased the urgency of
recognition of partnership and affected the way they presented it to the public.
In mirror fashion, AIDS and the fear of AIDS did not provide the central
motivation for those who organized the opposition to the ordinance—they
would have opposed it without the existence of AIDS. But the opponents also
evoked their own images from the epidemic in their efforts to defeat the
ordinance.
The Catholic and conservative Protestant clergy who were the principal
opponents were not concerned about the prospects of higher health costs—the
Catholic church had, for example, long favored generous social programs to
respond to health needs. What they disliked about the legislation was its central
messages: that homosexual relationships and nonmarital relationships were
socially acceptable. They believed that the traditional American family and
traditional Christian values were under siege, and they viewed the legislation as
encouraging their further disintegration. For them, calling a relationship a
"domestic partnership" did not change the issue into an innocuous secular
matter of shared finances. Whatever the relationship was called, it remained a
direct affront to marriage. They were concerned about the high rate of divorce,
the large number of children born outside marriage, and the temptations of
homosexual life for children struggling with their sexual identity. They viewed
the legislation as endorsing a style of life that they repudiated—wholly without
regard to AIDS.
The campaign the opponents waged against the legislation was modest in
scope. Several of the organizers refused to speak to the press. They did not
purchase ads in the local papers or on local radio or television. They did,
however, distribute two flyers widely. The Catholic archdiocese distributed
about 25,000 copies of one flyer through parish churches. The pamphlet never
mentioned AIDS or homosexuality. It stressed instead that marriages deserve
special treatment "in order to provide a secure and nurturing environment for
raising children," and it argued that the bill would give protection to transitory
relationships and thus "cannot help but erode the commitment of marriage in the
public mind."
The other flyer, supported by conservative Protestant groups, was mailed
to 90,000 voters they hoped would be sympathetic. This flyer evoked images
from the epidemic, although it did so subtly. Its cover showed a silhouette of
two men holding hands, with a caption reading "The Domestic
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Partners Law. It isn't FREE … and it isn't FAIR." Except in two brief
quotations, one from the Catholic archbishop, the other by the president of the
Kong Chow Benevolent Association, the pamphlet made no explicit references
to the traditional values that were the opponents' central concerns. Nowhere did
it refer to homosexuality as immoral. Nor did it make unsympathetic references
to people with AIDS. Instead, what it stressed repeatedly was the hidden dollar
costs of the bill—that it would force an immediate increase in the medical
insurance premiums that married city employees pay for insurance for their
spouses and that it would serve as the opening wedge for forcing the city, and
hence the taxpayers, to pay the premiums for unmarried partners. To bring
AIDS to mind, the opponents claimed that the bill invited abuse. "City
workers," the pamphlet warned, "might be pressured into claiming partnerships
as a means of helping friends suffering from AIDS and other chronic diseases to
obtain insurance." Echoing and reinforcing the cover of the pamphlet, the back
showed a pyramid of silhouettes of men holding hands—2 men in the top row,
4 in the second row, 22 in the eighth row, each man with a dollar sign
superimposed on his torso.
By election day, nearly all political organizations, newspapers, and
television stations in San Francisco had announced themselves in favor of the
legislation. Nevertheless, on election day, the bill went down to defeat—a
narrow defeat by a margin of 1 percent, but defeat nonetheless. It had received
overwhelming support in the Castro district, the predominately gay residential
area, but it was roundly rejected by older voters in the western part of the city
and narrowly rejected by the largely black community in Hunters Point.
The 1990 Election
Harry Britt would not give up. In the summer of 1990, he and three other
members of the Board of Supervisors voted to again place the domestic
partnership ordinance on the ballot in the November election. The ordinance
they proposed was a variant of the one defeated the year before. It appeared to
be the original bill stripped to its core. Gone were the provisions barring
discrimination by the county between married couples and domestic partners.
Gone was the special provision regarding hospital visitation. Retained was the
central section defining a domestic partnership and setting up the mechanism
for registering a partnership with the county clerk. Retained also was the section
requiring partners to agree to be jointly responsible for basic living expenses for
food and shelter, together with new language that permitted the agreement to be
enforced by anyone to whom such expenses were owed. New also was an
introductory section declaring that the purpose of the ordinance was "to create a
way to recognize intimate
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committed relationships, including those who otherwise are denied the right to
identify the partners with whom they share their lives." The idea was to invite a
vote for the legitimacy of gay and lesbian relationships. One of the principal
opponents viewed it more broadly—simply as "a referendum on homosexuality."
Each side geared up for another campaign. The opponents were somewhat
more outspoken this time, and the proponents somewhat more muted, but in
most respects the campaigns were the same. The proponents again emphasized
the justness of treating all loving relationships equally and again claimed, as to
costs, that there "was no bill to come due for tomorrow's taxpayers." Opponents
warned again of the threat to family, but also continued to express their
disbelief that there were no hidden costs to taxpayers. They widely distributed a
similar pamphlet, using again the silhouettes of hand-holding men wearing
dollar signs across their torsos. And, as before, all the city's newspapers and
principal radio and television stations endorsed the proposal.
One of the few major differences between the 1989 and 1990 campaigns
bore on the issue of AIDS. Shortly before the election, the wisdom of adopting
the ordinance was strongly questioned by several groups the proponents had
counted on as their allies. In early October, Clint Hockenberry, the director of
the AIDS Legal Referral Panel of Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom
and a vocal advocate of gay rights, warned of potential adverse effects of the
bill for people with AIDS. Pointing to the section in which partners had to agree
to be responsible for each other's basic necessities, he worried that partners of
people with AIDS would find themselves hounded by the creditors of their
dying friend—and he labeled the bill "a creditor's bill of rights" (O'Loughlin,
1990). He also worried that the size of grants that a person with AIDS was
eligible to obtain under various federal programs might be affected by the
attributed income of the partner. Hockenberry did not object to unmarried
partners accepting responsibility for each other. Rather, he was concerned that
people with AIDS might not understand the possible consequences of
registering and that the bill as drafted imposed responsibilities on domestic
partners without providing any concrete benefits of the sorts accorded to
married persons. Two weeks before the election, the city's Human Rights
Commission, an agency responsible for protecting gay persons against
discrimination, issued a staff memorandum entitled "Domestic Partnerships:
Obligations without Benefits? Recognition without Equality?" that echoed
many of Hockenberry's fears.
Hockenberry's attacks and the doubts of the commission staff left the
proponents with little time before election day. Britt's staff regarded
Hockenberry as a traitor. On the merits, they believed that, as a practical matter,
very few people with AIDS would be hurt if the ordinance was adopted.14 They
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also believed that Hockenberry was wrong in claiming that the bill gave no
immediate benefits. One benefit was obvious—the symbolism of recognition.
Another was more subtle but no less important. Although the bill did not in
itself provide any financial benefits for domestic partners, the proponents
believed that passage of the bill would goad San Francisco's Health Services
Systems Board into arranging with insurance companies to permit city
employees to obtain health insurance benefits for their partners. The language
about joint financial responsibility had in fact been included to make providing
insurance coverage more attractive to insurance companies.15 Once the city
provided access to insurance to domestic partners, private employers might be
encouraged to follow.
Even though the proponents saw and believed in these benefits, they were
nonetheless in an awkward position to respond. They could claim that the risks
were not what Hockenberry forecast, but they were reluctant to advertise the
bill as an opening wedge for insurance benefits for domestic partners of city
employees, since they had been claiming, accurately if somewhat misleadingly,
that nothing in the bill imposed any new costs on the taxpayers. The irony was
that a provision in the bill that was intended to help pave the way for insurance
coverage for the partners of city employees (some few of whom at any given
time would have AIDS) had led to the condemnation of the bill as a whole by
some other AIDS advocates who worried about a poorer group of people with
AIDS, who were not partners of city employees—and that this condemnation
might have jeopardized the entire bill.
The worries in the end proved groundless. For reasons that are not entirely
clear, the city's newspapers gave little coverage to the dispute, and the coverage
they gave made the matter seem technical and speculative. On election day, the
ordinance carried by a wider margin—9 percentage points—than any other
proposition on the ballot. A poll before the election had indicated that younger
registered voters were overwhelmingly in favor of the ordinance and older
voters overwhelmingly against it. In a survey conducted by the San Francisco 
Chronicle, of registered voters aged 18 to 34, 70 percent favored the bill and 24
percent opposed it; of voters aged 55 and over, 25 percent favored the bill and
65 percent opposed it. Voters aged 35 to 54 favored the bill 56 to 35 percent.
Disparities that wide based on age are quite unusual—and one major difference
between the 1989 and 1990 elections was that the 1989 elections had been in an
"off year" when little else was on the ballot and fewer younger people eligible
to vote actually did so.
The 1990 elections as a whole were regarded by San Francisco's gay
political community as a triumph. In addition to the passage of the domestic
partnership ordinance, two lesbians won positions on the Board of Supervisors,
and a gay man was elected chair of the School Board. Some of
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the proponents of the domestic partnership bill believed that the popularity of
the bill had helped secure the victory of the gay and lesbian candidates. In
December 1990, as the proponents had quietly hoped during the campaign and
the opponents had ominously forecast, the Health Services Systems Board
voted to make health insurance available to domestic partners of city
employees, an action that carried a $1.1 million initial cost to the county.16 And,
pushing one step further toward equality for domestic partners, the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors, now with three gay or lesbian members, passed
a unanimous resolution to recommend to the California legislature that it alter
the marriage laws to permit same-sex persons to marry.17
New York City
The issue of domestic partnerships arose in New York in a quite different
context, a context in which it was the judiciary, not the legislative or executive
branches or the voters, that took the dominant role. In 1989, in the case of
Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., New York's highest court, the New York Court
of Appeals, decided that, for certain purposes, a same-sex companion counted
as a member of his or her partner's "family" (74 N.Y. 2d 201, 543 N.E. 2d 48
(1989)). Here again, the particular issue might have arisen without regard to
AIDS—in fact, had arisen often outside the context of AIDS—but AIDS made
the problem seem more urgent and affected the tone of the debate and possibly
even its resolution.
Succession Rights Before the Epidemic
The Braschi case arose in the context of New York's complicated schemes
of rent control and rent stabilization and involved the problem often called
succession rights. Succession questions arise on the death of a tenant in a rent-
regulated apartment. For example, a tenant's spouse, partner, daughter, or
mother has lived with the tenant for years but has never been a party to the lease
and, after the tenant's death, wants to remain in what has become the family
home. The person wants to remain in the apartment at the regulated rent, which
is far below the rent for comparable unregulated apartments. The landlord in
turn typically wants the person evicted because the rent regulation statutes
provide that, once such an apartment becomes empty, the landlord is free to
raise the rent for a new tenant to whatever the market will bear and to continue
to raise rents annually at the percentage rate provided for rent-stabilized or, in
certain cases, for free-market apartments. New York law provides different
schemes of regulation for rent control and rent stabilization. Under both
schemes, the regulations prohibit landlords from dispossessing some relatives
on the death of a tenant. In the
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context of rent stabilization, landlords have persistently challenged the authority
of the state's Division of Housing and Community Renewal to issue any
regulations and have often been successful in the courts.
Over the years before the Braschi case, the Division of Housing and
Community Renewal and the legislature had struggled with defining a group of
family members who would be entitled to remain in a rent-stabilized apartment
on the death of the tenant. At least six proposals had been adopted by the
agency or passed by one house of the legislature over a period of a few years.
None of the proposals, however, included a nonmarital partner among the
protected survivors. The legislative and administrative efforts had centered on
which persons related by blood or marriage would be covered and how long
such a person would have to have lived in the apartment to be eligible for
protection.
The struggle in the legislature over succession was less a public debate
over the appropriate definition of family than simply one more skirmish in the
unending political battles between tenants and landlords. In general, landlords
detested rent control and rent stabilization and found a sympathetic ear in the
state senate, which was controlled by Republicans and which typically
supported landlords' positions. Landlords had no particular moral view to
purvey about whether stepparents or siblings or even gay or lesbian partners
deserved protection. They simply wanted a profit from their investments, and in
that context any successor posed an impediment. Many tenants did care about
protecting their family members, but succession rights were simply one of many
matters about which tenant groups cared each time the legislature was
considering rent regulation issues. In their lobbying, tenant groups had never
given any special priority to protecting the interests of unmarried partners in
general or gay and lesbian partners in particular. Tenants obtained their
principal support from Democrats in the Democrat-controlled state assembly.
On three occasions, the assembly voted for some form of succession rights for
family members, and on each occasion, the senate refused to act on the proposal.
Succession Rights in the Context of AIDS
Between 1985 and 1989, while the legislature and the housing agency
grappled fumblingly with a series of proposed solutions, the number of AIDS
cases in New York City increased severalfold. The Legal Aid Society, which
provides legal services for the poor, and the Gay Men's Health Crisis, a large
HIV/AIDS service organization in New York City, began to receive frequent
requests for help from men who had lost their partner (the tenant) to AIDS and
wanted to remain in the apartment they had shared. In many cases, the surviving
partner had taken care of the tenant over the course of a long illness and was
now sick himself.
PUBLIC POLICIES ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 231
Thus, during this period, the lower courts in New York began to hear cases
involving the gay partners of persons who had died of AIDS. The great majority
dealt with rent-stabilized apartments, not rent-controlled apartments, because
vastly more units in New York City are covered by the rent stabilization
program. Facing cases of a surviving gay partner in a rent-stabilized apartment,
a few judges started providing relief. One court, for example, held that, so long
as a state agency continued to give protection to a list of relatives such as
stepchildren or fathers-in-law, the equal protection clause of the Constitution
required that a long-term gay domestic partner be given the same protection
(Two Associates v. Brown, 502 NYS 2d 604 (Sup. Ct. 1986)). The court
reasoned that there was simply no rational basis for giving relief to a stepchild
or father-in-law, who may have depended little on the deceased, while denying
it to a life-long gay companion, who was much more likely to have been
emotionally tied to the deceased. Some lower courts agreed, but others did not.
During this same period, the only legislative proposal that would have
provided succession rights to an unmarried partner came from Governor
Cuomo. In January 1989 he proposed that succession rights be made available
to any person (partner or otherwise) who had lived in the tenant's apartment for
5 years or more. The governor's proposal was never introduced into the
legislature. By the summer of 1989, the agency's powers to issue protective
regulations of any sort were still in doubt and the legislature, caught in the usual
crossfire, enacted no legislation. In fact, some politicians and agency and other
officials were by this time looking to the New York Court of Appeals in hopes
of a resolution.
The Braschi case, the case that everyone watched when it came before the
Court of Appeals, arose under the rent control program, the smaller, older, and
more rigorous rent regulation scheme, a program that was in disfavor with the
legislature and that was slowly being phased out. Since the 1940s that program
had included a specific regulation that dealt with succession. In the mid-1980s,
the succession section provided that, on the death of a tenant in a rent-controlled
apartment, the landlord could not dispossess "either the surviving spouse or
some other member of the deceased tenant's family who had been living with
the tenant" (New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations). An unresolved
question the state agency and courts faced was whether a domestic partner
counted as part of the tenant's "family." The agency had consistently interpreted
the term to include only a list of people related by blood or marriage.
The particular case that came before the Court of Appeals involved a gay
man, Miguel Braschi, who had lived with his partner, the tenant, for 10 years
and had cared for him through a long illness. At Braschi's request, the papers
filed with the court were silent about his partner's illness, but anyone reading
the record would have inferred that the partner had died of
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AIDS. In preparing to bring the case before the Court of Appeals, Braschi's
lawyers believed that the many accounts in newspapers and on television of gay
partners taking care of a partner with AIDS were likely to have made
sympathetic impressions on the judges, impressions that could be helpful as the
court decided how expansively to interpret the term "family." Thus, in their
brief, Braschi's lawyers emphasized the close and loving relationship between
the partners and the "painstaking care" that Braschi had provided during his
partner's illness and hospitalizations (Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. & Co., Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 2). They urged the court to reject a narrow and technical
view of family based on blood or marriage and to accept instead a functional
definition more in keeping, in their view, with twentieth century living patterns.
In oral argument before the court, the lawyers drew on examples from the HIV/
AIDS epidemic to remind the judges of the many partners who faced eviction,
and the judges in turn responded with questions that drew on the epidemic.
To drive home the AIDS-related concerns in this case, a group of AIDS
care providers, including organizations from several boroughs of the city, filed
a brief with the court that stated that, while exact numbers were impossible to
calculate, there were surely thousands of gay men with AIDS living in New
York with partners much like Braschi (Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. & Co., Brief of
Gay Men's Health Crisis, pp. 15-19). They also brought in materials on the
growing problem of homelessness among people with AIDS. They referred the
court, by name, to 16 other cases involving succession rights then pending or
recently decided in the lower New York courts, all of which involved an
unmarried partner, nearly all of which involved a tenant with AIDS, and some
of which involved a surviving partner who was himself ill and desperate to
remain in the joint apartment (pp. 23-24). The City of New York filed a similar
brief emphasizing the problem of homelessness for HIV-infected people
(Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. & Co. , Brief of City of New York, pp. 2-3).
The record before the court also included a submission from Russell
Pearce, general counsel of the city's Commission on Human Rights, who
reported an increasing number of complaints of discrimination against people
with AIDS—414 complaints in the first six months of 1988, nearly as many as
in the entire preceding year. Pearce argued that if the court did not rule for
Braschi, "thousands of people affected by AIDS who live in non-traditional
family units will face eviction at a most difficult time in their lives" (Braschi v.
Stahl Assoc. & Co., Affirmation of Russell Pearce).
The apartment Braschi wanted to retain was owned by a real estate
company. The company's lawyers, in their briefs and arguments to the court,
tried to stay away from AIDS (Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. & Co., Brief of
Defendant-Respondent). They mentioned the disease only once in their brief, in
a footnote that seemed to try to deflect sympathy based on AIDS
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by pointing out that there was no evidence in the record that Braschi's partner
had AIDS. They also sought to undercut sympathy for Braschi in particular by
pointing out that his partner was a rich man and that, as his heir, Braschi could
afford other housing at prevailing market rates. On the legal issues, they urged
the court to accept a traditional definition of family, one that would be more
consistent with the agency's practices and more certain of application. Unlike
the opponents of the domestic partnership ordinance in San Francisco, they
were not motivated in their opposition by moral concerns about family values or
about homosexuality, and they did not make such appeals to the court. Nor did
the Roman Catholic archdiocese or other religious groups appear before the
court to make such arguments.
The court, in its decision, accepted Braschi's position. Cutting through all
that the legislature had been unable to resolve, the court began by observing that
the term "family" in the rent control statute was neither defined elsewhere in the
statute nor discussed in any legislative materials over the years. With such a
vacuum, the court believed that it would be most consistent with the
legislature's purpose of protecting "a narrow class of occupants other than the
tenant of record" to look not to "fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history"
but rather to the "reality of family life" (Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. & Co., p. 53).
Accordingly, the court decided that the proper definition of family should
include, among others, "two adult life-time partners whose relationship is long-
term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and
interdependence'' (Braschi , p. 54). The court prescribed a list of factors for the
lower courts to consider in deciding individual cases—factors such as the
longevity and exclusivity of the partners' relationship, their level of emotional
and financial commitment, and the reliance the couple placed on one another
for daily services.
The court ended its decision by sending Braschi's case back to the trial
court to permit the trial judge to determine whether Mr. Braschi met the new
criteria, but in summarizing the facts alleged by Braschi, the court left little
doubt about the appropriate outcome. If Braschi could prove what he had alleged
—a relationship of 10 years, with the partners regarding each other as
"spouses," holding themselves out as a couple to friends and relatives, and
sharing finances, and with Braschi the primary heir of his partner's estate—he
should be considered a member of the tenant's family and assured succession.
The court never mentioned AIDS, but almost everyone with any connection to
the case believed that AIDS had been on the judges' minds.
By any standard the decision of the New York Court of Appeals was
adventurous. As a dissenting judge pointed out, the decision seemed
inconsistent with the legislature's overarching goal of phasing out the rent
control program as original tenants of apartments died, inconsistent with the
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traditional definition of family, and inconsistent with the practice of the agency
administering the rent control statute, which had always limited its
interpretation of family to a small group of relations by blood or marriage.
Worse yet, the dissenting judge complained, while the narrower view of family
merely requires a simple determination of a blood tie or a link by marriage, the
new interpretation placed an already overworked agency in the unfortunate
position of having to make inquiries, on a case-by-case basis, into a number of
highly personal, subjective factors, such as two persons' level of emotional
commitment to each other (Braschi, pp. 55-57).
The decision, when announced in July 1989, received a great deal of
attention in the press. Legislators had predictably opposing reactions. Many in
the Assembly praised the decision. In contrast, conservative State Senator
Marchi proposed an amendment to New York's constitution that would have
limited the meaning of "family" in all statutes and regulations to spouses, their
children, their parents, and their in-laws. No legislation was ever seriously
considered in either house. In the succeeding months, nearly all official activity
shifted once again to the rules relating to rent stabilization, the larger rent
regulation program, for nothing in the Braschi case, a rent control case, dealt
directly with rent stabilization, and the legislature remained as paralyzed as ever
in deciding between the conflicting demands of tenants and landlords.
Impact of the Braschi Decision
After months of delay and intense lobbying from a variety of groups,
including gay rights organizations, the Division of Housing and Community
Renewal in 1990 issued new regulations to cover rent-controlled and rent-
stabilized apartments (Title 9, New York City Rent Regulations, Subtitle S,
Subchapters A and B (1990)). Despite intense resistance from representatives of
the landlords, Braschi carried the day for rent control and rent stabilization. The
new regulations began with findings of fact to support the regulations. In its
findings, the agency emphasized the general problems of homelessness and the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, which, by the estimates on which it relied, had infected
between 124,000 and 235,000 New Yorkers. Of this group, the great majority,
the agency stated, were gay men or members of "low-income groups … two
groups most likely to live in nontraditional households" and were thus most in
peril of losing their homes. In the new rules themselves, the agency expanded
its old list of people related by blood, marriage, or adoption and provided
succession rights to other persons "who can prove emotional and financial
commitment and interdependence" with the tenant. The regulations went
somewhat further than Braschi and made clear that a sexual relationship
between the parties was irrelevant; thus, a long-term resident who had a
relationship with the tenant much like
PUBLIC POLICIES ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 235
that of a child or a sibling would also be protected. Finally, in a provision
reminiscent of San Francisco's domestic partner registration, the new
regulations provided that people who wished to be in a position to claim
succession rights could file with the landlord a form provided by the agency
informing the landlord of the familial relationship.
At the time the new rules were issued, William Rubenstein, Braschi's
attorney in the Court of Appeals, exulted that they were "the most far-reaching
recognition of lesbian and gay relationships ever granted by any government
agency in the United States." After extended litigation, the new regulations have
been upheld (Rent Stabilization Association of New York v. Higgins, 562 NYS
2d 962 (App. Div. 1990)).
Braschi may have already exerted some effects in New York beyond rent
regulations. Immediately after Braschi was decided, then Mayor Edward Koch
announced another form of recognition of the domestic partnership relationship.
By executive order, he expanded the policy on "bereavement leave" available to
city employees to cover bereavement leave for a domestic partner (or a
domestic partner's child or parent) in the same manner as bereavement leave for
a spouse (Executive Order No. 123 (1989)). City employees who might want to
take such leave under the policy were to register their partnerships with the
city's Department of Personnel. The changes in bereavement policies were
already being drafted in the mayor's office when Braschi was announced, but
the generally positive public response to Braschi may have encouraged the
mayor's office to proceed with releasing them and helped to create a positive
climate at the time they were released.
CONCLUSIONS
Newborns and Children
The most significant effect of AIDS on social policies bearing on
newborns and children has been to force a response by social service systems
that are already under stress to families who are similarly already under stress.
The responses have often revealed basic tensions, inconsistencies, and
anomalies in governmental policies that relate to children and their families.
Children with HIV arrive into a world of social services and legal doctrines
formed before they were born and shaped without children like them in mind,
shaped by compromises among many conflicting social goals. It should thus
hardly be surprising that high points and gaps appear in the public response to
them: model programs, generously funded and of which cities can be proud,
reach only some of the affected children, while large numbers of other children
have needs that are not met at all or are met much
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less well. Funding for children with HIV disease is more generous in many
regards than funding for adults with HIV disease, but it is uneven in ways that
reflect society's ambivalence about the parents of these vulnerable children.
Children with HIV disease or AIDS might be better off if most of the
policies discussed in this chapter were different—if there were not wide
disparities among states in support programs for families, if within states the
payments to biological parents caring for a child were closer to the payments to
foster parents, if all pregnant women were tested for HIV infection whether
they wanted to be tested or not, if foster parents for HIV-infected children had
as wide authority as biological parents to make decisions on behalf of the
children in their care. Yet each of these policies is supported by deeply held
beliefs about the roles of government and parents in an individualistic
democracy, and thus far, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has not led to any
fundamental reappraisal of those beliefs. What the long-term effect of the
epidemic will be on these policies is as yet impossible to say. At this time, it
seems likely that the epidemic will simply serve as another example of the
durability and resilience of long-held public values in the United States
regarding families and the state.
Recognition of Unmarried Couple Relationships
Looking back, what role did AIDS play in shaping the political and
judicial struggles that led to the new, broad housing rules to protect domestic
partners and other nontraditional family members in New York City and to the
domestic partnership ordinance in San Francisco? That question cannot be
confidently answered. It can at least be said, however, that it is highly unlikely
that the state agency in New York would have acted when it did to protect such
families if it had not been for the Braschi decision and for the lobbying of the
agency by gay rights and AIDS groups, who were outside the usual political
fights between tenant and landlord groups.
The question that is harder to answer is whether Braschi itself would have
been decided the way it was but for the epidemic of AIDS. The case that came
before the New York Court of Appeals, the case of Miguel Braschi, not only
evoked some sympathy in itself—a loving partner who had cared for his dying
companion—but also surely evoked images of many other similar companions
and of yet other homeless persons dying of AIDS in city shelters. In their briefs,
the supporters of Braschi had certainly gone out of their way to evoke such
images in the belief that they would affect the judges. More globally, in the
years that immediately preceded Braschi, what AIDS had also done, as it had
done in San Francisco, was to raise the political consciousness of many gay
men and lesbians and lead to the creation of organizations that urged the courts
and legislatures to adopt an enlarged view of families.
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It thus seems quite possible that AIDS contributed in New York and in San
Francisco to the recognition of domestic partnerships and to the recognition of
other nontraditional family relationships for which no lobbying voice exists. In
both New York City and San Francisco, the recognition of domestic
partnerships would have been important to gay and lesbian couples even if
AIDS had never happened, but AIDS, for all its tragic effects, may have led the
larger community in both cities to confront and accept, at least for certain
purposes, families who had once been unseen or, if seen, rejected as different. If
this has been the role of AIDS, it is in some sense an amiable paradox: a fatal
disease, associated in the public mind with promiscuous sexual acts, a disease
so stigmatizing that Miguel Braschi had not wished its name to be mentioned,
nonetheless contributed to the recognition and acceptance of a variety of
emotionally intimate and interdependent family ties that were once outside the
law.
NOTES
1. Illinois and Louisiana passed and later repealed statutes mandating premarital HIV antibody
screening, largely because of their lack of cost effectiveness (Childress, 1991).
2. Northern New Jersey is the geographic area with the third largest number of pediatric AIDS
cases; for a brief description of the response to AIDS in Newark, see Williams (1989).
3. Pediatric AIDS cases constitute about 1.7 percent of the cumulative U.S. total through December
31, 1991 (Centers for Disease Control, 1992); in December 1991, they constituted about 3.2 percent
of the cumulative cases in Miami and 2.3 percent of cumulative cases in New York City.
4. For example, see the provisions for pediatric AIDS health care demonstration projects in P.L.
100-202 administered by the Office of Maternal and Child Health of the Health Resources and
Services Administration.
5. The information in this section is based on the materials cited and interviews with staff members
of state and city agencies and private foster care agencies.
6. The description is based on interviews with staff members of the Leake and Watts Children's
Home and on Gurdin (1990).
7. The information in this section is based on the materials cited, presentations made at hearings by
the panel in Miami on July 1, 1990, and interviews with the staff of Jackson Memorial Hospital and
other agencies in Miami.
8. Some of the children left the program when, after initially testing positive for the HIV antibodies,
they later seroreverted to HIV negative.
9. A few years ago, payments for foster parents caring for a child with AIDS were even higher.
Florida's pattern of high payment rates was set at a time when Jackson Memorial had many boarder
babies. Payments of even $3,000 per month per child seemed a bargain to many public officials in
comparison with the even higher costs—$800 to $1,000 per day per child by some estimates—and
the negative publicity they received when housing children in the hospital.
10. To protect mothers, Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami generally will not permit a biological
father to give consent to test a child in circumstances in which the hospital is not certain whether the
father knows the HIV status of the mother (interview with Dr. Terry Mastrucci, October 1990).
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11. Some people and groups object to state-imposed testing over a mother's objections on broader
grounds. They oppose mandatory testing of any group—babies, prisoners, health care providers, air
traffic controllers, etc.—on the grounds that the arguments for it are tenuous and that the risks are
great that approval of it will lead to even less justified mandatory testing of other groups and,
ultimately, to greater discrimination against HIV-infected people.
12. Obtaining the consent of the biological parent(s) consent also protects the state from a lawsuit
by the only people likely to sue if the test is performed.
13. This section is based on interviews with proponents, opponents, and observers in both cities and
on examinations of legal materials, newspaper accounts, and political campaign literature.
14. Julia Lopez, head of San Francisco's Department of Social Services, issued a memorandum
stating that "passage of the domestic partners initiative would not have any effect on the eligibility
for benefit programs administered by the department." The Human Rights Commission staff though
Lopez might have been hasty in her conclusions.
15. Some insurance companies insist that dependents of an employee to whom they provide
coverage be a person to whom the employee has some legal obligation.
16. San Francisco's health plan for its employees does not provide coverage even for spouses;
rather, it allows employees to purchase coverage for their spouses (and dependent children) at group
rates. The board's action in December 1990 permitted employees with domestic partners to purchase
insurance for their partners at the same rates. The extra $1.1 million in costs to the county was due
to the fact that the insurance companies demanded a higher premium for all dependents if domestic
partners were to be covered, and the city wanted to make certain that adding domestic partners did
not force employees with spouses to pay higher premiums than they already were.
17. A ballot initiative seeking to repeal San Francisco's domestic partnership ordinance failed in
November 1991 (Chung, 1991).
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